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ABSTRACT
Obtaining lower generalized system of preferences (GSP) tariffs requires meeting costly Rules of
Origin (ROOs). Growing coffee in the shade is more costly, but yields a price premium. This paper
analyzes the effects of such restrictions in a general equilibrium setting and shows that such policies
may have unanticipated effects. It is shown that in a world with capital mobility, the GSP could
result in capital outflows rather than inflows and consumer preferences for shade grown coffee end
up hurting labor in developing countries. Even small subsidies that are contingent on the use of
domestic intermediates can result in specialization in the targeted good. Value added contingent
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kmk4@psu.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Trade and domestic policies are often conditional in practice: only if certain
conditions are met is a set of beneﬁts obtained. Content protection schemes in
developing countries often require ﬁrms in an industry to use at least some level
of domestic inputs. In a Free Trade Area (FTA) producers become eligible for
zero tariﬀs (when exporting to a partner in the FTA) if the product is deemed
to have domestic origin. Otherwise, they must pay the going tariﬀ. Under
the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) poor developing countries obtain
preferential tariﬀs only if the product is deemed to originate in the developing
country.1 In some countries, producers obtain preferential access to inputs only
if they export their products. Similarly, products produced in environmentally
friendly or socially acceptable ways, (like dolphin safe tuna (caught using nets
that allow dolphins to escape), or shade grown coﬀee (so that tree cover re-
mains), or carpets made by adults (not children) and certiﬁed as such,2 or food
certiﬁed as organic), command a higher price. Since the price obtained is con-
ditional on the technique used, this also falls under the banner of conditional
policies.
The eﬀect of such conditional policies in a general equilibrium setting has
been neglected. This paper shows that the use of simple duality arguments al-
lows us to answer such questions in a simple and relatively general manner. A
particular policy, namely, the level of ROOs in the FTA, is used for illustrative
purposes. It will be evident that the approach applies to all the above exam-
ples though details may well diﬀer between applications. For example, some
1Most products, other than arms and numerous agricultural goods, are covered by the GSP.
The conditions under which origin is granted are deﬁned by the Rules of Origin (ROOs).
2Senator Harkin introduced a “Child Labor Deterrence Act” in 1994 to allow imports
of such goods to be potentially prohibited. Such an act has not so far made it through
the committee process. However, Senator Harkin introduced another bill, “The Child Free
Consumer Information Act”, which would provide a voluntary labeling system, the accuracy
of which would be enforced by a commission.
1practices confer a direct beneﬁt to the consumer: organic food is perceived as
better tasting and better for you, so that labeling would occur voluntarily. In
this case, there is no role for government other than that of checking that labels
are accurate. Other practices, like dolphin safe tuna, are costly to implement,3
and do not impact on the quality of the product per se. In such cases, certiﬁca-
tion, combined with consumer disapproval, could make companies follow such
practices.4 On the other hand, rules of origin in an FTA have to be set and
enforced, at substantial cost to producers and to government.
There is a literature on labeling in the trade and environmental economics
area. However, it is, by and large, cast in a partial equilibrium setting. Rolo
and Winters (2000) argue that taxes, in one form or the other, should be used to
deal with environmental externalities while labeling should be used to deal with
information asymmetries arising from individuals not knowing the attributes
of the product. Beaulieu and Gaisford (2002) look at policies to inﬂuence eco
dumping and make a case for the use of conditional policies. Matto and Singh
(1994), Freeman (1994) along with a host of other work suggests that when
asked, consumers say they are willing to pay signiﬁcantly more for environmen-
tally friendly goods. However, marketing science research suggests that even
small price diﬀerences result in consumers purchasing the cheaper good when
quality is the same. If this is true, labeling so as to avert consumer displeasure
3The furor over dolphin safe tuna arose, to begin with, after March 8th 1988, when all the
major U.S. networks broadcast a tape of hundreds of dolphins being killed by the Panamanian
tuna ﬁshing boat “Maria Luisa”. A boycott of tuna led to all the major canned tuna producers
committing to only selling dolphin safe tuna! Voluntary restraints on such harvesting in the
Eastern Paciﬁc (mostly by the U.S. though also involving Mexico and Latin American coun-
tries) were replaced by binding agreements (the international dolphin conservation program
act) among the states concerned in 1998. (See Dyck and Zingales (2002).)
4An in between case, where there are some reasons to adopt the practice independent of
consumer willingness to pay, is shade grown coﬀee. Shade growing results in bigger beans and
greater fruit weight without compromising on ﬂavor at low altitudes as shade protects from
temperature extremes. Shade grown coﬀee reduces deforestation as well as providing enhanced
pest control and enhancing bird diversity. Under optimal conditions, however, coﬀee can be
grown eﬃciently in the open with the use of high levels of agro chemical inputs which have
possible adverse runoﬀ eﬀects.
2would be a fragile force.
Previous work on Rules of Origin and content protection and preference
has also taken a partial equilibrium approach. Early work by McCulloch and
Johnson (1973), Grossman (1981) and Mussa (1984) considered competitive set-
tings while Krishna and Itoh (1988) look at a duopoly and strategic interaction
eﬀects. Krueger (1999) and Krishna and Krueger (1995) look at ROOs in a
partial equilibrium setting. The most closely related papers to this one are Ju
and Krishna (1998) and (2002). Using a partial equilibrium setting, they point
out an essential non monotonicity occurs when the link between ﬁnal and in-
termediate goods markets is accounted for. If the requirement that has to be
met is easy to meet, all ﬁrms choose to do so. In this regime, one set of com-
parative statics results are obtained. At some point, however, ﬁrms will become
indiﬀerent between meeting and not meeting the restriction. Some ﬁrms meet
the requirement, while others do not. In this regime, the comparative statics
results are reversed.5
However, a deep understanding of such situations is still lacking. The cur-
rent paper develops a way of looking at such situations in a general equilibrium
setting under perfect competition. The model is based on the dual approach
utilizing the factor price frontier. It will become clear that the approach devel-
oped here has a host of applications in a variety of areas. Using the techniques
developed, questions such as the eﬀects of encouraging stricter labor standards
internationally through trade policy or the eﬀects of consumer movements build-
ing a market base for environmentally friendly products can easily be dealt with
in a general equilibrium setting.
Section 2 lays out the basic tools taking a physical content requirement to
be the requirement for origin in the FTA. Section 3 looks at the eﬀects of FTAs
5This points to the importance of allowing ex ante identical ﬁrms to behave diﬀerently ex
post. Even the classic papers in this area do not seem to appreciate this.
3with ROOs (deﬁned as a physical requirement) in general equilibrium in the
presence and absence of capital mobility. It is shown that when ROOs are set
at ex ante just binding levels, they need not be binding ex post, nor must they
result in an inﬂow of capital. However, they always result in an expansion of the
aﬀected sector, and increased trade deﬂection though the economy as a whole
may shrink.6 Section 4 considers a value added ROO. With such a ROO, it is
shown that the concavity of the cost function need not always obtain, and as
a result, duality cannot be exploited fully. In addition, when factors are not
good substitutes, there can be many equilibria despite the absence of market
imperfections. Section 5 concludes.
2T h e B a s i c T o o l s
Although the tools are standard, there is a slight twist in their use that needs
some explaining. Using a mixed metaphor, conditional polices have a carrot and
hoop element to them. The carrot, preferential treatment in the case of ROOs
in the FTA, is obtained only by jumping through hoops, namely, meeting origin
requirements. We ask, what factor prices can a ﬁrm aﬀo r dt op a yi fi tc a nc h o o s e
to avail itself of these conditional policies? The basic insight used in this paper
is that if, by taking advantage of the policy, the ﬁrm can raise the factor prices
it can aﬀord to pay, it will be willing to do so. Otherwise, it will not. In other
words, we look at the eﬀects of such restrictions on the factor price frontier.7
We then use the dual deﬁnition of the standard revenue function: namely, as
the value function for the problem of minimizing factor payments subject to the
factor price frontier. Given the availability of resources and technology, if the
6Less central results are relegated to appendices. The ﬁrst extends the technique to ROOs
which require a particular intermediate input to be produced domestically. The second derives
the eﬀects of making ROOs more restrictive and argues that the kind of non monotonicity
seen in Ju and Krishna (1998) is likely to be prevalent in general equilibrium.
7In a way, such restrictions can be viewed as a combination of a tariﬀ and technological
regression.
4opportunities created by the FTA increase the factor price that ﬁrms can pay,
then the restriction matters in equilibrium.
2.1 The Revenue Function
It is easiest to illustrate the approach with one good and two factors, capital
(K) and labor (L) with prices r and w respectively. Let factors be supplied
inelastically and let w
r = ω, the wage rental ratio. Consider a unit isoquant
with K on the vertical axis. Combinations of K and L that lie above the unit
isoquant are feasible ways of producing a unit of the good. Unit costs are
minimized where the slope of the unit isoquant equals −w
r . Minimizing unit
cost involves using [aL(ω),a K(ω)] to make the good, that is, using a capital
labor ratio of
aK(ω)
aL(ω) = k(ω). Denote the minimized unit cost by c(w,r).
The curve p = c(w,r) deﬁnes the factor price frontier in this one good
e c o n o m ya n di sd e p i c t e di nF i g u r e1. As is well understood, the equilibrium
factor prices can be obtained as the solutions to minimizing factor payments
subject to p ≤ c(w,r), while the revenue function is the value function for this
problem.8 Equilibrium factor prices for a one good economy at price p, and
endowments V =( L,K), would be given by the tangency of the line wL+ rK
to the curve p = c(w,r) which occurs at I.
As long as constant returns to scale are preserved and the restrictions do
not make the cost function non concave, we can proceed in the same manner
when considering conditional policy schemes. We will ﬁrst derive the factor
price frontier under the scheme and then minimize factor payments subject to
the factor price frontier to get equilibrium factor prices.
Suppose we consider a physical content requirement as the origin rule: in
particular, that the capital labor ratio used in production be weakly below an
upper limit or aK
aL ≤ ¯ k. When we consider the unit isoquant as done earlier we
8See Dixit and Norman (1979).























































see that in order to meet the origin rule, inputs must lie below the ray from
t h eo r i g i nw i t hs l o p e¯ k as well as above the unit isoquant. Let the wage rental
ratio that induces a capital labor ratio of k be ω(k). Hence, only if the wage
rental ratio exceeds ω(¯ k) is the requirement binding. In this event, it is easy
to see that cost minimization involves just meeting the origin rule. Let these
distorted input choices be denoted by
£
aL(¯ k),a K(¯ k)
¤
. Consequently, the unit
cost of production when meeting the requirement is
c(w,r,¯ k)=waL(¯ k)+raK(¯ k) >c (w,r),i fω> ω (¯ k)
= c(w,r),i f ω ≤ ω(¯ k).
The factor price frontier in the FTA with ROOs is, thus, given by combining
this with the option of ignoring the FTA. This is depicted in Figure 1. The
physical content requirement has to be met for the ﬁrm to obtain the higher
price, pT, from selling in the FTA. Since obtaining a higher price allows factors
to be paid more, the higher price alone results in the price equal to cost curve in
the absence of any policies being proportionally blown up to the level given by
6pT = c(w,r). However, in order to obtain the higher price pT = p(1+t),w h e r et
is the ad-valorem default tariﬀ, a sub-optimal technique, namely, (aK(¯ k),a L(¯ k))
is used if ω>w (¯ k), where w(¯ k) is the slope of ray from the origin to B in Figure
1. Since it would be optimal to use this technique if the restriction were binding,
unit costs given the restriction is binding would be given by the line tangent to
the curve pT = c(w,r) at B with slope ¯ k. Note that if the wage rental ratio is
not too high, this line lies above the factor prices a ﬁrm can aﬀord to pay and
meet costs, if it ignores the conditional policy, so that it is in its interest to take
advantage of the policy. Once the wage rental ratio exceeds ˜ ω(¯ k), as depicted
in Figure 1, it is best to ignore the conditional policy.9
The highest factor prices that a ﬁrm can pay, if it has the option of availing
itself of a conditional policy of this form, is, therefore, given by GHBD in Figure
1. This is the augmented price equal to cost curve and the relevant factor price
frontier with a single good. The tangency of the line wL + rK to this frontier
gives the equilibrium factor prices. If there is only one good and the ROO is set
at exactly the pre-FTA level of k, then any wage rental ratio along the straight
line part of the factor price frontier would be equilibrium wage rental ratio. It
is easy to see that even a slightly binding ROO could cause large factor price
changes. For example, if the ROO is set at ¯ k, then the wage rental ratio would
rise to ˜ ω(¯ k). Making the restriction weaker, that is raising ¯ k, will also raise the
corresponding ˜ ω(¯ k) but that as long as pT >p ,˜ ω(¯ k) >w (k).
With many goods, the factor prices that each sector can aﬀord to pay in the
presence of such policies, can be derived in the same way. The factor price fron-
tier is then the set of factor prices that lie above all these (possibly augmented)
price equal cost curves. Factor prices which minimize factor payments subject
to this set are the factor prices in equilibrium. Goods (techniques) which have
9Note that making the restriction stricter, that is lowering ¯ k, will also lower the corre-
sponding ˜ ω(¯ k).
7cost exceeding price are not made (used), and output levels are determined so
that factor markets clear. The value function for this problem yields the revenue
or national income function.
2.2 Equilibrium Conditions in FTAs with ROOs
Suppose that there are two goods, 1 and 2,a n dt w oc o u n t r i e s ,A and B, which
form the FTA. Assume that there is no specialization prior to the FTA and
that both countries import good 1. Denote the world price by p∗ and label the
countries so that country A has a lower tariﬀ and, hence, a lower domestic price
of good 1 prior to the FTA. If one of the countries exports the good to the other
after the FTA,i tm u s tb eA as its domestic price is lower than that in B. There
are no export subsidies and good 2 is assumed to be freely traded and is taken
as the numeraire.10
Superscripts A and B refer to the countries while the superscripts 0 and 1
refer to pre and post FTA levels respectively. Let e(P,u) and r(P,V) denote
the standard expenditure and revenue functions, where P denotes the vector
of prices. Subscripts on e(P,u) and r(P,V) denote the partial derivative with
respect to the subscripted variable. As usual, by the envelope theorem, eP(.)=
ch(.), the vector of Hicksian compensated demands. Similarly, rP(.)=x(.),t h e
supply of goods, while rV (.)=w(.), the vector of factor prices.





1 a r eg i v e nb yt h et a r i ﬀs set by each country and the ﬁxed
world price. Setting expenditure equal to income gives the equilibrium levels of
10Alternatively, A can be thought of as the developing country who obtains lower tariﬀs
when exporting to B if it meets origin requirements. For the most part the example will be
the FTA one but the analogy to the GSP example is obvious.





















1 a r eg i v e nb yt h et a r i ﬀsp r i o rt ot h eFTAand the ﬁxed world price. Instead
of the standard revenue function we now need to use the constrained revenue
function, where factor payments are minimized over the factor price frontier in
the presence of the FTA and the given ROO. Call this function R(p,1,V). It
has the usual properties of a revenue function. For any given pB1
1 , we can get






















1 ,1,u B1) − Rp1(pB1
1 ,1,VB) − rp1(pB1
1 ,1,VA).
s1 is the excess of B’s demand over FTA supply at pB1
1 .I fs1 is positive, then
B must import from outside the FTA a n da st h ew o r l dp r i c ei sﬁxed, pB1
1 =
pB0
1 . As A imports all its consumption at its pre FTA price, its tariﬀ revenue
is tAep1(pA0
1 ,1,u A1) while B’s equal tBs1(pB1
1 ) as given above. On the other
hand, if s1 is negative, i.e., the FTA can supply all of B’s needs, then pB1
1
equals pA0






while B obtains no tariﬀ revenue. If s1 is zero,
then A imports all its consumption from the rest of the world, B imports nothing






and (3), (4), and (5) can be used to solve for the endogenous variables.
93 Physical ROOs
We proceed by examining the eﬀects of ROOs deﬁned in physical terms requiring
a minimum use of labor relative to capital. We look at the eﬀects of the FTA
both with and without capital mobility assuming that the ROO is set at the pre
FTA level. Two cases are considered: when good 1 is relatively capital intensive
and when it is relatively labor intensive.
3.1 Restricting the Capital Intensive Good
Assume good 1 is relatively capital intensive. Then the FTA allows A to obtain
ah i g h e rp r i c ef o rg o o d1 by exporting to B on preferential terms if it meets the
ROO.
3.1.1 Price Eﬀects of Status Quo ROOs
The factor price frontier on the assumption that the ROO is set at the status quo,
namely, the pre FTA capital labor ratio in sector 1, is depicted in Figure 2(a) by
BCDAF. Before the FTA the prices faced by producers in A are (pA0
1 ,p 2), and
the factor price ratio is ω0, which occurs at the intersection of the price equal
to cost curves for the two goods. The capital labor ratios in the two sectors
are kA0
1 and kA0
2 and the economy wide capital labor ratio, kA0, lies in between
them. Being forced to use the pre FTA capital labor ratio to meet origin makes
the factor price frontier depart from that associated with a higher price of good
1 alone only at wage rental ratios above ω0. If the ROO is set at the pre FTA
capital labor ratio in Sector 1 and pB1
1 exceeds pA0
1 , the factor prices that ﬁrms
can just aﬀord to pay are given by BCDAE while the factor price frontier for
the economy is given by BCDAF in Figure 2(a). As is evident, such a ROO
is not binding in equilibrium.11 Access to higher prices for good 1 raises r and
11The factor price changes in A cause a ROO set to be just binding prior to the FTA to
be not binding after the FTA. It is easy to see that even an initially slightly restrictive ROO


















































































11lowers w for country A thereby reducing the capital labor ratio in both sectors.12
These are direct consequences of the Stolper Samuelson Theorem.
Consider the supply of good 1 from A when the ROO is set at kA0
1 . Recall
that kA0 is the aggregate capital labor ratio. At p1 =¯ p1, the slope of the curve
¯ p1 = c1(w,r) where it intersects the curve p2 = c2(w,r) is given by kA0 as
depicted in Figure 2(a). AR O Os e ta tkA0
1 results in complete specialization in
good 1 for prices at or above ¯ p1. When the price is ¯ p1, the ROO does not bind in
equilibrium so that capital labor ratio in making good 1 in equilibrium equals the
aggregate capital labor ratio, specialization occurs and supply becomes vertical.
AR O Oa tkA0
1 is not binding at any price above pA0
1 .T h u s ,A’s supply to B is
as depicted in Figure 2(b). It is zero at prices below pA0
1 as ﬁrms in A can do
better by selling domestically in this event. At pA0
1 ﬁrms are willing to supply
to B, and as price rises, the normal supply response occurs. When the price
reaches ¯ p1,Aspecializes in good 1 and supply becomes inelastic.
Similarly, B’s excess demand for good 1 from A is zero at all prices above
pB0
1 a si tc a no b t a i ng o o d1f r o mt h er e s to ft h ew o r l da tpB0
1 . It equals its total
excess demand for good 1 at prices below pB0
1 and is horizontal at pB0
1 as shown.
Whether the price in B after the FTA is pA0
1 , or pB0
1 , or in between depends on
t h es i z eo fA’s supply relative to B’s excess demand. If A is large and B is not,
then the price faced by consumers and producers in A and B will be pA0
1 . All
of B’s imports of good 1 will be produced in A while A will import enough to
meet its own demand.
If B is large and A is not, then the price faced by consumers and producers in
B will be pB0
1 . Consumers in A will face pA0
1 while producers will face pB0
1 .S o m e
will not be binding in equilibrium. A ROO has to be stricter than ˆ k, the slope of the price
cost curve in 1 at A in Figure 2, in order to be restrictive in equilibrium. Of course, as the
price diﬀerential in the two countries falls, the corresponding ˆ k rises so that this minimally
restrictive ROO is less strict.
12If the price in B falls, the opposite happens in B.
12of B’s imports of good 1 will be produced in A while all of A’s consumption will
be imported.
If both A and B are large, the price faced by consumers and producers in B
post FTA lies in between these two extremes.13 Consumers in A will face pA0
1
while producers will face pB1
1 .
If A is large, it will supply all B’s imports and A must gain from the FTA
due to its appropriation of tariﬀ revenue from B. B’s prices fall but it is worse
oﬀ than if it merely reduced its tariﬀst og e ti t sp o s tFTAprice level as it loses
tariﬀst oA.I fB is large but A is not, B must lose as its prices are unaﬀected
and it loses tariﬀ revenue. In contrast, A must gain as it not only gains tariﬀ
revenue but it exports good 1 to B a n dt h i sp r i c er i s e sw h i l ei t sc o n s u m e rp r i c e s
are unchanged.
Thus, to summarize, a ROO on the capital intensive good set to be initially
just binding is not binding after the FTA. The FTA raises the welfare of the
lower tariﬀ country in the FTA and can reduce the welfare of the higher tariﬀ
country: it must do so if this country is large.
3.1.2 Allowing Capital Mobility
Allowing capital mobility into country A has very standard eﬀects along the lines
of Mundell (1957). We assume that there is a function G(rA), which deﬁnes the
rental rate in A such that there are no capital ﬂows to A.14 Also, we assume
that G(rA0)=0 . W ea s s u m et h a tG(r) is increasing in r. Since r is weakly
higher in A after the FTA (as p weakly rises in A), capital will ﬂow into A.T h e
inﬂow shifts the production possibility frontier of country A out further in good
1 than good 2 as good 1 is capital intensive and (via the Rybczynski Theorem)
13Note that A can completely specialize in serving B after the FTA only if pB0
1 > ¯ p1, which
is how Figure 2(b) is drawn.
14Changes in the price faced by producers and consumers in B will also aﬀect rental rates
there and as rental rates will fall in B, we would expect capital outﬂows from B. If capital in
B is mobile, then analogous output changes would occur there.
13shifts out the supply curve for good 1 from country A. The process comes to an
end when one of two things occurs. Either enough capital ﬂows in to make pB1
fall to pA0 so that pre FTA equilibrium factor prices are reinstated in A, or A
specializes in good 1. The former occurs if A has enough labor to meet all of B’s
demand at pA0.I f A has a small enough labor force, then a price diﬀerential
between A and B can be maintained but A will specialize in making good 1.
To illustrate, consider ex ante just binding ROO so that the ROO is set at
the pre FTA capital labor ratio in good 1,n a m e l y ,kA0
1 . Now suppose enough
capital has ﬂowed in to make the aggregate capital labor ratio in A equal to
kA0
1 and that A’s labor force is small so that the producer and consumer price
in B, which equals the producer price in A, denoted by pB1
1 , still exceeds pA0
1 as
depicted in Figure 3(a). At this aggregate capital labor ratio, A is specializing in
Good 1. This follows from the fact that the capital labor ratios in both sectors at
D, the incomplete specialization point, where price equals cost for both sectors,
lie below kA0
1 .A sd e p i c t e di nF i g u r e3(a), the equilibrium factor prices are given
by the point C, which lies just above A, t h ep r eF T Ar e n t a lr a t ei nA.R e n t a l
rates are equalized, preventing further capital inﬂows, but wages in A are higher
than before the FTA.
3.2 Restricting the Labor Intensive Good
What if good 1 is relatively labor intensive? Figure 4 i st h ea n a l o g u eo fF i g u r e
2 for this case. If the ROO is set at the pre FTA capital labor ratio in Sector
1 and pB1
1 exceeds pA0
1 , the factor prices that ﬁrms can just aﬀord to pay are
given by the line BCADF while the factor price frontier for the economy is
given by GADF in Figure 4(a). As is evident, such a ROO is strictly binding
in equilibrium.15
15The factor price changes in A cause a ROO set to be just binding prior to the FTA to be
strictly binding after the FTA.
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` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` ` `
16Access to higher prices for good 1 raises w and lowers r for country A thereby
raising the unconstrained capital labor ratio in both sectors and making a pre-
viously just binding ROO strictly binding. If the price in B falls, the opposite
happens in B.
Consider the supply of good 1 from A. If pB1
1 = pA0
1 , then the ROO is just
binding. Firms in A are indiﬀerent between selling in A and selling to B. This
is responsible for the horizontal segment at pB1
1 = pA0
1 in Figure 4(b). As pB1
1
rises, it is easy to verify that factor prices move from E along GE. Supply of
good 1 in A rises with pB1
1 since R(.) is convex in prices and R1(.) equals supply.
The equilibrium price in B after the FTA depends on the size of A relative to
B as before.
Note, however, that there is one minor diﬀerence in the behavior of supply.
A will not specialize in good 1 at any price. As p1 rises from pA0
1 , factor prices
move from E towards G in Figure 4(a).A l l ﬁrms in Sector 1 choose to meet
the ROO so that the capital labor ratio in Sector 1 is ﬁxed at kA0
1 while that
in Sector 2 rises with pB1
1 . The economy wide capital labor ratio lies between
them,16 so that both goods are always made. Hence, w rises and r falls in A
due to the FTA, in line with Stolper Samuelson eﬀects, unless A is large and
can supply all that B demands at pA0
1 . Note that whether the targeted good
is labor intensive or capital intensive, an FTA results in trade deﬂection: the
lower tariﬀ country’s production of the good is exported to the partner whose
price weakly falls due to the FTA, while it imports its own needs.
Now consider capital mobility. Since r falls due to the FTAunless A is large
relative to B, capital will ﬂow out of A rather than into it. This outﬂow shifts
the production possibility frontier of country A in and does so more for good 2
than good 1 as good 2 is capital intensive. Via the Rybczynski theorem, capital
16This is ensured because there in no specialization in the initial equilibrium.
17outﬂows shift the supply curve for good 1 from country A outward. Of course,
the supply for good 2 is shifting in with the shift in of the PPF. The shift out
in the supply curve of A, in turn, reduces the price of good 1 in B. The process
comes to an end when one of two things occurs. Either enough capital ﬂows
out to make pB1
1 fall to pA0
1 so that the pre FTA equilibrium factor prices are
reinstated in A. This occurs when A is very large: even after enough capital has
left for the aggregate capital labor ratio in A to equal the pre FTA capital labor
ratio in Sector 1 in A, A is still able to supply all that B demands at pA0
1 . If it is
n o ta b l et od os o ,t h e nap r i c ed i ﬀerential between A and B can be maintained
but A will specialize in making good 1.
This is illustrated in Figure 4(a). Suppose enough capital has ﬂowed out of
A to make the aggregate capital labor ratio equal to kA0
1 and that A0s labor
f o r c ei ss m a l ls ot h a tt h ep r i c ei nB, denoted by pB1
1 , still exceeds that in
A, pA0
1 . At this aggregate capital labor ratio A is specializing in good 1.T h i s
follows from the fact that the capital labor ratios in both sectors at D,t h e
incomplete specialization point, lie weakly above kA0
1 , so that there must be
specialization. As depicted in Figure 4(a), the equilibrium factor prices are
given by a point along AD, which lies vertically above E. Thus, rental rates
are equalized, preventing further capital inﬂows, but the wages in A are higher
than before the FTA. Thus, general equilibrium analysis suggests that the FTA
need not always result in capital ﬂo w i n gi n t ot h el o wt a r i ﬀ country in order to
export to the high tariﬀ one! As shown, if Sector 1 is labor intensive, capital
may well ﬂow into Sector 1, but ﬂow out of the economy as a whole.
An obvious implication of this result concerns the eﬀects of the GSP on de-
veloping countries. Developing countries, being relatively labor abundant, tend
to have a comparative advantage in labor intensive goods. Thus, oﬀering them
lower tariﬀs on their exports (if origin is met) will tend to raise w and reduce r
18thereby leading to capital ﬂowing out of the developing country! Even though
the labor intensive sector expands, the capital intensive one would contract even
more!
It is fairly straightforward to extend the above analysis to other applications.
Consider the example of shade grown coﬀee given earlier. Suppose there are two
ways to make coﬀee, one is shade grown and, as machinery is harder to use in
this setting, relatively labor intensive. The other is on plantations using more
mechanization and fertilizer. Then the price equal to cost curve of coﬀee will be
a composite of the two techniques in the usual manner: namely, use the shade
grown technique when the wage rental rate is low and the plantation one when
the wage rental ratio is high. A preference for shade grown coﬀee manifested
in a price premium oﬀered for shade grown coﬀee will shift the shade grown
part of the composite curve up. Now, if the shade grown technique is not being
used, this shift could, if it is large enough, ensure the use of the shade grown
technique. However, its eﬀect on factor prices in general equilibrium depends on
whether coﬀee is more or less intensive than the other good, call it food. If coﬀee
is more labor intensive than food under both techniques, then this premium,
at a given price for regular coﬀee, would raise the wage rental ratio, while if it
was always more capital intensive than food, it would lower it a la the Stolper
Samuelson theorem.17 Thus, whether workers in the developing country making
coﬀee gain or lose from such a price premium, and whether one should expect
capital inﬂows or outﬂows from the economy depends on the capital intensity of
what else is being made. Similarly, we can reinterpret the example calling the
two techniques the dolphin safe technique and the other. The main results for
conditional policies, where the requirement is a physical one, are summarized
in Proposition 1.
17Also, factor intensity reversals could occur even if they are none for the two techniques
separately.
19Proposition 1 Policies which provide an incentive to produce the capital in-
tensive good conditional on meeting a physical requirement on inputs, need not
involve distortions on the input side in the ﬁnal equilibrium even if they are
binding at the initial equilibrium levels. However, if the good is relatively labor
intensive, distortions on the input side occur even if the physical requirement is
not strictly binding to begin with. In the presence of capital mobility, such poli-
cies always attract capital to the targeted sector and raise supply so that trade
deﬂection is greater when capital is mobile. However, they do so at the cost of
capital outﬂows from the economy as a whole when the targeted sector is labor
intensive.
3.3 Extensions
Two extensions are considered. Their details are in the Appendix. First the
eﬀects of more restrictive ROOs are analyzed. It is shown that the same kind of
non monotonicity that occured in Ju and Krishna (1998) also occurs here and
for similar reasons.
Proposition 2 There are two regimes: in one all ﬁrms in Sector 1 make the
same choices (homogeneous regime) and in the other, ﬁrms makes diﬀerent
choices (heterogeneous regime). Making ROOs stricter moves the economy from
the homogeneous to the heterogeneous regime and can ﬁrst raise exports to B
and then reduce them.
Second, the technique is extended to ROOs which require a particular in-
termediate input to be produced domestically. This extension is useful as such
ROOs are common. It also provides an example where even a very slight ROO
of this form in an FTA can result in drastic changes in production patterns.
Proposition 3 When policies provide a beneﬁt conditional on the use of do-
mestic intermediates, their eﬀects can be extremely discontinuous. Even if the
20domestic intermediate is currently in use, the smallest beneﬁt, conditional on
its use, can result in specialization in the targeted sector.
4 Value Added ROOs
The analysis is also relevant for value based restrictions. However, with value
based restrictions, the ROOs cause a form of an externality that can create
multiple equilibria and limit the use of the dual approach used so far. With
the value added restriction in eﬀect, how can restricted cost functions not be
concave? The set of inputs that both make a unit of output and meet the
ROO in this case depends on factor prices. As a result, one cannot make the
usual argument that choices available to a ﬁrm are unaﬀected by prices, and
as a result, the value function for a minimization problem has to be concave.
In fact, as we will see below, with ﬁxed coeﬃcients costs cannot be concave in
factor prices in the presence of a value based ROO. Consequently, the factor
price frontier need not have the usual shape. Hence, the full use of duality, in
particular the interpretation of the revenue function as the value function of the
dual minimization problem, is not possible. However, the price equal to cost
conditions remain necessary for equilibrium and we can associate equilibrium
with the intersection of the curves as before. Multiple equilibria occur because
the non standard shapes of the price equal to cost curves allow for more than
one intersection of the price equal to cost curves in a way that permits multiple
equilibria to arise.
Suppose the restriction is that the value of wL
wL+rK ≥ θ. This is equivalent
to k ≤ ω
(1−θ)
θ . T h ef e a s i b l es e ti sn o wd e ﬁned by combinations of K and L
that lie above the unit isoquant and below the line k =
ω(1−θ)
θ . Thus, the
constraint is that k should lie below the line
ω(1−θ)
θ = k(ω,θ). Hence, the shaded
region in Figure 5 is the feasible set. There are two further complications in
21deﬁning the input choice set. The ﬁrst is that the feasible set of inputs depends
on ω. However, it is obvious from Figure 5 that if the constraint is binding,
the cost minimizing input coeﬃcients lie on the unit isoquant and just meet
the constraint. Let these input coeﬃcients be denoted by [aL(θ,ω),a K(θ,ω)],
which in the above example would be the point B in Figure 5. Note that if the
constraint is binding at a given ω,i tm u s tr e q u i r eal o w e rc a p i t a ll a b o rr a t i o
than the unconstrained cost minimizing capital labor ratio, i.e., k(ω,θ) <k (ω)
as depicted in Figure 5.
Let the cost, assuming that these inputs are used, be denoted by
c(w,r,θ)=waL(θ,ω)+raK(θ,ω).
By deﬁnition,c (w,r,θ) must strictly exceed c(w,r) whenever the constraint is
strictly binding. Hence, in w, r space, the curve p = c(w,r,θ) must lie below
the curve p = c(w,r) when the constraint is binding and touch it when the
constraint is just binding.
4.1 The Role of Input Substitutability
Where does the constraint bind? This depends on the substitutability between
inputs. Recall that the constraint can be written as ω
k ≥ θ
1−θ. Start from the
constraint being just binding. Assume the elasticity of substitution between
capital and labor falls short of unity. In this event, a fall in ω results in a
smaller percentage fall in k so that ω
k falls, while a rise in ω results in a smaller
percentage increase in k so that ω
k rises. Hence, the constraint does not bind
for increases in ω but does bind for decreases in ω. If, on the other hand, the
elasticity of substitution between capital and labor exceeds unity, a fall in ω
results in a larger percentage fall in k so that ω
k rises, while a rise in ω results in
a larger percentage increase in k so that ω
k falls. Hence, the constraint binds for
increases in ω but does not bind for decreases in ω, exactly as in the physical
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ROOs case. If the elasticity of substitution is less than unity, the constraint
binds for low ω, not high!
The above facts are enough to depict the price equal to cost curves. Instead
of drawing these we will use Figure 1 to illustrate the similarities and diﬀer-
ences. The curve pT = c(w,r,θ) must lie below the curve pT = c(w,r) when
t h ec o n s t r a i n ti sb i n d i n g ,t o u c h i n gi ta tt h ep o i n tw h e ni ti sj u s tb i n d i n g . I f
the elasticity of substitution exceeds unity, the constraint binds for high ω, as
was the case with the physical content deﬁnition of ROOs studied earlier. The
composite price equal to cost curve looks like GHBD in Figure 1, except that
the segment HB is not linear. It is easy to verify that the analysis of the eﬀects
of value based ROOs in this case is similar to that associated with a physical
deﬁnition of ROOs and we leave this to the reader.
If the elasticity of substitution is less than unity, the constraint binds for low
ω. The composite price equal to cost curve looks like EBKF except for BK
23not being linear.18 As a result, a ROO at the status quo level is binding in the
FTA, if good 1 is capital intensive, but not, if good 1 is labor intensive, rather
than the other way around. Once this is noted, the eﬀects on factor prices and
the direction of factor ﬂows can be analyzed as usual. Thus the relevant change
in the results is given below.
Proposition 4 Policies which provide an incentive to produce the labor inten-
sive good conditional on meeting a value based requirement on inputs, need not
involve distortions on the input side in the ﬁnal equilibrium even if they are
binding at the initial equilibrium levels. However, if the good is relatively capi-
tal intensive, distortions on the input side occur even if the requirement is not
strictly binding to begin with.
4.2 Multiple Equilibria
With value based ROOs, multiple equilibria may exist. Consider the case where
there are ﬁxed coeﬃcients in both sectors, the targeted sector is relatively labor
intensive, and the ROO is set to be slightly binding in the initial equilibrium
as depicted in Figure 6.F o r ω>˜ ω, the ROO is not binding and the ﬁrm
can obtain the higher price at no extra cost. The ROO is just binding, if ω
equals ˜ ω. Lower values of ω force ω
k below θ
1−θ making the constraint binding.
The absence of substitutability makes producers use more L per unit of output
to meet ROO even though it has a zero marginal product. Recall that the
constraint is wL
wL+rK ≥ θ. When w falls, meeting the ROO exactly, which is the
least cost way of meeting it, involves raising L by the same percentage as the
fall in w so that wL is constant. Consequently, so is the ratio, wL
wL+rK.T h i s
explains the vertical segment CD in Figure 6. Once the wage falls below the
18If the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor equals unity, then ω
k is a constant
and equals the (constant) share of labor in costs relative to that of capital. If this share ratio
is identical to θ
1−θ, the constraint is never binding and if it is not, it is always binding.




















































point given by C, it is best to ignore the ROO.
Note that when the ROO is binding, i.e., for low w, af a l li nw results in
an equi-proportional increase in L used per unit of output so that unit cost is
constant. When it is not binding, i.e., for high w, it is linear and increasing in
w. This gives a convex composite curve, not a concave one providing an example
of the non concavity of the cost function mentioned earlier.
Note that the two price equal to cost curves in the presence of the ROO
intersect three times: once at A, then at E, and lastly at B. At A, the wage
rental ratio is high. Thus, the constraint is not binding and there is no cost
to meeting the ROO, only the beneﬁt. All ﬁrms in Sector 1 meet the ROO.
Output is given by the factor market clearing conditions
aL1X1 + aL2X2 = L
aK1X1 + aK2X2 = K.
At B, the wage rental ratio is low. Thus, the constraint is binding and an
ineﬃcient level of labor needs to be used to meet the ROO. The cost to meeting
25the ROO exceeds its beneﬁt as the low wage rental ratio requires a considerable
waste of labor to meet the ROO and no ﬁrms in Sector 1 meet it. Though,
output at B i st h es a m ea st h a ta tA as there are ﬁxed input coeﬃcients, trade
patterns diﬀer as there is no deﬂection: A does not send its production to B
and import its own needs.
At E, the wage rental ratio is at an in between level so that not much extra
labor needs to be used to meet the ROO. Hence, the cost of meeting the ROO
is less than the beneﬁta n da l lﬁrms meet the ROOs. However, as more labor
needs to be used in the production of good 1 to meet the ROO the factor market
clearing conditions are given by
aL1(ωC)X1 + aL2X2 = L
aK1X1 + aK2X2 = K
where aL1(ωC) >a L1. Hence the output of good 1 must fall and that of good 2
rise. However, trade deﬂection occurs and the output of 1 is sent to B.
In the standard setting with concave costs, even if there were multiple intere-
sections of the price cost curves (as would occur with factor intensity reversals)
the factor price set over which factor payments are minimized would remain a
convex set. As a result, endowments using the dual deﬁnition of the revenue
function would pin down factor prices. Here this technique cannot be used as
this factor price set is not convex. All three intersections, A, B and E are pos-
sible equilibria. Factor prices are not pinned down in this setting, and hence,
multiple equilibria occur.19
Proposition 5 With value based ROOs, there can be multiple equilbria as fac-
tor endowments do not pin down factor prices and supplies even in the standard
two good model.
19Factor availability does not completely pin down the equilibrium here.
26Finally, note that in the above ﬁxed coeﬃcient example, the ROO on the
labor intensive good can be interpreted as trying to raise the cost share of labor.
Note that in all three equilibria, wages weakly rise as does the share of labor in
costs.20 However, this is not the case when the ROO is on the capital intensive
good. Consider a ROO on the capital intensive good set so that it is just
binding at the pre FTA wage rental rate. It is straight-forward to verify that it
is strictly binding in the unique post FTA equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the
wage rental rate falls relative to that under free trade while the share of labor
in costs is unchanged: lower wages are compensated for by the wasteful use of
labor in producing the capital intensive good. However, in the labor intensive
good, labor share falls! Output of the capital intensive good falls and of the
labor intensive one rises. Thus, attempts to make the capital intensive good use
more labor would backﬁre and reduce wages, overall labor share in income, as
well as its output.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper provides a simple way of using well understood tools in trade to
better understand “conditional policies” of various kinds. The results suggest
that the form of the ROO, the intensity of the sector it is applied to, and the
extent of input substitutability have important roles to play in determining the
eﬀects of such restrictions. Moreover, that regime switches and non monotonic
behavior are endemic in such settings. For these reasons, such policies may
have unanticipated eﬀects and need to be carefully analyzed before being im-
plemented.
20At B wages and cost share is unaﬀected.
276A p p e n d i c e s
6.1 Making ROOs More Restrictive
The object of this section is to convince the reader that comparative statics in
such models is likely to involve regime switching and non monotonicity as found
in Ju and Krishna (1998) and (2002). To illustrate, we consider the case where
good 1 is capital intensive and country B is large while A is small. Also, we
assume that A is not specializing in either good prior to the FTA. We ask, what
is the eﬀect of more restrictive ROOs on the equilibrium?
Proposition 6 Making ROOs stricter can ﬁrst raise exports to B and then
reduce them.
Our apparatus makes this analysis quite simple. Since B is large and A is
s m a l l ,t h ee q u i l i b r i u mp r i c ea f t e rt h eF T Ai spB0
1 .k 0 in Figure 7 denotes the
slope of the curve pB0
1 = c1(w,r) at its intersection with p2 = c2(w,r) at A.
ROOs less restrictive than k0 are not binding in equilibrium. Let k00 be the
s l o p eo ft h el i n ea n c h o r e da tB and tangent to the curve pB0
1 = c1(w,r) at L
as depicted in Figure 7. Note that with ROOs more restrictive than k00, it is
optimal to ignore the possibility of meeting the ROOs and getting lower tariﬀs
since the factor price frontier will not include this possibility. Let the aggregate
capital labor ratio be kA0 and assume that kA0
1 >k 0 >k A0 >k 00 >k A0
2 as
drawn in Figure 7.
Start from a ROO at k0. At this level, or for levels less restrictive than
this, the ROO is clearly not binding in equilibrium.21 When the ROO is set
at k0, the price equal to cost curve in Sector 1 with the FTA would be DHAJ.
The intersection of the price equal cost curves in the two sectors would occur
at A and the factor price frontier would be DHAI. Given our assumptions,
21In fact, it would not be binding at any possible equilibrium values of pB
1 .


















































equilibrium factor prices would lie at A, where factor payments are minimized
subject to the factor price frontier. Country A would not specialize in either
good.22
With a ROO at k0, the FTA raises A’s output due to a normal supply
response to increasing prices. Neither consumer, nor producer surplus in B is
aﬀected by the FTA and as B loses tariﬀ revenues while A gains it, B is made
worse oﬀ. A is better oﬀ as producer prices as well as tariﬀ revenues are higher
while consumer prices are unchanged.
When the ROO is between k0 and k00, the two price equal to cost curves will
intersect somewhere along AB in Figure 7. If the ROO were set at k000 >k A0,
the two curves would intersect at T. The factor price frontier would be DCTI.
Factor payments would be minimized along AB at T, both goods would be made
and all the ﬁrms in sector 1 would exactly comply with the ROO, i.e., all ﬁrms
22If kA0 >k 0, then equilibrium factor prices would lie at H.C o u n t r yA would specialize
in good 1 but some ﬁrms would meet the ROO and some would not because the slope of the
price equals cost line at H when the ROO is not met is steeper than kA0. The mix of ﬁrms
would be such as to ensure that factor markets cleared.
29would be the same ex post as well as ex ante, so we are in the “homogeneous
regime”.
If k000 <k A0, then only good 1 w o u l db em a d ea n df a c t o rp a y m e n t sw o u l d
be minimized at C. When all ﬁrms in sector 1 do the same thing, we say the
regime is homogeneous. If k000 <k A0, then though country A would specialize
in making good 1, some ﬁrms would meet the ROO while others would not.
This is termed the heterogeneous regime. When the ROO is stricter than k
00
,
equilibrium factor prices are at B and ﬁrms prefer not to invoke the FTA and
the FTA is undone.
How can non monotonicity in exports to B come about in this setting? Con-
sider what happens when the ROOs are between kA0 and k0. In this case both
goods are made and all ﬁrms making good 1 meet the ROO. More restrictive
ROOs will raise w and reduce r as equilibrium factor prices move along BA.
However, the capital labor ratios in the two sectors will move in opposite direc-
tions. The capital labor ratio used in Sector 2 will rise due to labor becoming
relatively more expensive, while that in Sector 1 will fall due to the ROO be-
coming more restrictive. Thus, the unit labor requirement in Sector 1 will rise
and the unit capital requirement will fall while the unit labor requirement in
Sector 2 will fall and the unit capital requirement will rise.
As Sector 2 is labor intensive, the labor market clearing constraint is ﬂatter
than the capital market clearing one in output space.23 If, in addition, there
is relatively little substitutability in inputs in Sector 2, then the unit labor
and capital requirements in Sector 2 will not change much so that the lines
representing factor markets clearing will not shift much where they hit the
vertical axis. However, the labor market clearing line will shift in and the
capital market clearing line will shift out where they hit the horizontal axis. As
23We put X2 on the vertical axis and X1 on the horizontal axis.
30a result, output of good 1 will rise (and with it exports to B as all ﬁrms meeting
the ROOs export) and of good 2 will fall when the ROO is made more strict!
However, when the constraint becomes so strict that only good 1 is made, i.e.,
the ROO is between kA0 and k00, we move to another regime. There are two kinds
of ﬁrms making good 1, the ones who meet the ROO and use labor intensive
techniques, and the ones who do not and use capital intensive techniques. No
one makes good 2. Equilibrium is along HB. As the ROO gets stricter, we move
down HB, so w/r falls. Firms who meet the ROO use a lower capital labor
ratio because they have to, while ﬁrms who choose not to meet the ROO use a
higher capital labor ratio than the ﬁrms who meet the ROO. A stricter ROO
will reduce the capital labor ratio of those meeting the ROO as well as reduce
w/r and, hence, reduce the capital labor ratio of those not meeting the ROO.
Since both capital labor ratios are falling, the output of ﬁrms meeting the ROO,
the labor intensive ones, must fall and exports to B must fall. In other words,
since both use a lower capital labor ratio, the capital constraint is loosened (the
K constraint shifts out) and the labor constraint is tightened (the L constraint
shifts in) so that there is more output made by ﬁrms not meeting the ROO and
less by ﬁrms meeting it. Hence, there are fewer exports of good 1 to B from A!
Once the ROO becomes stricter than k00, it is ignored and there are no
exports from A to B of good 1. Thus, we can easily get non monotonic behavior
in the supply of good 1 from A to B at a given price as the ROO changes.
Summarizing the above, when the ROO is weak, it does not bind in equi-
librium, both goods are made and all ﬁrms making good 1 choose to meet the
ROO and export to B. Initially, stricter ROOs have no eﬀect. Once the ROOs
become binding at k0, stricter ROOs raise w/r and in this regime, exports to B
from A rise. This regime prevails until the ROO hits kA0. At this point, only
good 1 is made and all ﬁrms meet the ROO. Further restrictiveness of the ROO
31results in a lower ω, more ﬁrms not meeting the ROO, and exports to B falling,
though only good 1 is made. Once the ROO passes k00, there is another change
in regime: both goods are made and the FTA itself is undone as ﬁrms choose
to ignore its existence!
6.2 Domestic Intermediate Use
Consider policies that are conditional on the use of a domestic intermediate.
This application is useful both because the model is slightly diﬀerent technically
from the phyical requirement studied above and because it provides an addi-
tional message: unlike price based policies (like tariﬀs and subsidies), where the
eﬀects of polices are continuous, conditional policies that are very “small” can
have large eﬀects. Hence, special care should be taken when such polices are
used. An example is provided below.
Consider a common form of ROO that requires the use of domestic interme-
diates to obtain origin. For example, under NAFTA, transformation from any
other chapter (2 digit classiﬁcation level) of the harmonized system to tomato
catsup, chapter 21, confers origin except transformation from tomato paste,
though paste falls in chapter 20. In other words, to get origin, domestic tomato
paste has to be used to obtain origin and be eligible for zero tariﬀsf o re x p o r t s
to the U.S.
Suppose that production requires the use of an intermediate input, which
is available from the rest of the world at a price of P∗I. It can also be made
domestically at cost cI(w,r).N o t e t h a t e v e n i f cI(w,r) exceeds P∗I, ﬁrms
making good 1 in A may choose to use the domestic intermediate since it confers
origin and allows them to export duty free to B whose domestic price, pB1
1 , may
be higher than that in A, denoted by pA0
1 .
Proposition 7 When policies provide a beneﬁt conditional on the use of do-






























mestic intermediates, their eﬀects can be extremely discontinuous. Even if the
domestic intermediate is currently in use, the smallest beneﬁt, conditional on
its use, can result in specialization in the targeted sector.
Firms in A choose between meeting the ROO and not. If the ﬁrm does not
meet the ROO, it can aﬀord to pay factors along c1(p∗I,w,r)=pA0
1 . If they
choose to meet the ROO, they can aﬀord to pay factors along c1(cI(w,r),w,r)=
pB1
1 >p A0
1 . We assume that the ROO is set at an initially just binding level
so that in the initial equilibrium ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between the domestic and
imported intermediate input, i.e.,c I(w,r)=p∗I. Since all goods are made in
A to prior to the FTA, it must be that all three price equal to cost curves,
namely, c1(p∗I,w,r)=pA0
1 ,c 2(w,r)=p2, and cI(w,r)=p∗I go through the
same point. For simplicity, cI(w,r)=p∗I is not drawn in Figure 8. Hence,
the curve c1(cI(w,r),w,r)=pA0
1 also goes through the same point. Standard
arguments show that c1(cI(w,r),w,r) has all the usual properties of a cost
function including concavity.
33At any given (w,r), it is easy to verify that the slope of c1(cI(w,r),w,r),
called ˆ k1, is a convex combination of slopes of c1(p∗I,w,r), called k1, and
cI(w,r), called kI.24 As a result, the curve c1(cI(w,r),w,r)=pA0
1 lies be-
tween the curves c1(p∗I,w,r)=pA0
1 and cI(w,r)=p∗I. Figure 8 is drawn so
kI > ˆ k1 >k 2 >k 1.
Since ﬁrms in A can obtain the higher price prevailing in B, if they meet the
ROO, the curve c1(cI(w,r),w,r)=pA0
1 shifts out to c1(cI(w,r),w,r)=pB1
1 .
As a result, the composite price equal to cost curve for ﬁrms making good 1 is
given by c1(p∗I,w,r)=pA0
1 for low w/r and by c1(cI(w,r),w,r)=pB1
1 for high
w/r, the dark curve in Figure 8.
Next, add the price equal to cost curve for good 2.A s d r a w n , g o o d 2 is
more capital intensive than good 1 but less than ˆ k1 at the initial factor prices.
In this case, the composite price equal to cost curve for good 1 would lie above
that for good 2 everywhere no matter how small the diﬀerence between pA0
1 and
pB1
1 ! Hence, only good 1 w o u l db em a d eb ya l lﬁrms in A.N o t e t h a t e v e n a
ROO that is just binding prior to the FTA, and where the conditional subsidy
is small, can result in drastic changes in production patterns. Even if the ROO
is set to be non binding prior to the FTA, and no matter how small the tariﬀ
diﬀerences in A and B, the economy will end up specializing in good 1. Other
cases are left to the interested reader.
24Recall that from Shephard’s Lemma,
cr(.)


























w(.) and lies between zero and one.
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